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ABSTRACT1 
This article explores a gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario for Europe as an 
alternative to the current direction of austerity policies over the medium to long-term. Using a 
macroeconomic forecasting model we demonstrate that the dual aim of economic growth and 
increases in both male and female employment can be achieved via the adoption of gender-
sensitive expansionary macroeconomic policies and by overturning austerity policies. 
Projections for our gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario suggest that an 
additional 14 million jobs, of which 9 million are for women, could be created by 2030 in the 
Eurozone and the United Kingdom by reversing austerity policies and marshalling 
government expenditure and investment towards female and male employment. We also 
show that these positive results are not achieved at the expense of high levels of debts and 
fiscal deficits. The main recommendation is for Europe to roll back austerity policies and to 
embark on a new gender-focused economic trajectory.  
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1. Introduction 
Job creation for both men and women should be a high priority for European policy makers 
given the unsustainable high levels of unemployment rate in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and the persistent employment gap between men and women across Europe.  Instead, 
economic policies to date have overwhelmingly focused on attempts to cut both government 
debt and deficit by adopting a series of austerity measure with negative consequences for job 
creation and growth.  
This paper explores a gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario for Europe as 
an alternative to the current direction of austerity policies. This alternative scenario focuses 
on the need to generate higher growth, to create jobs across Europe, and to narrow the gap 
between female and male employment rates in Europe. We base our assumption on existing 
empirical evidence which shows that policies focusing on employment generation and 
investment are one of the best strategies for stimulating future growth and, crucially, for 
reducing government debt in the medium to long term (see e.g. Terry McKinley and 
Giovanni Cozzi, 2011, Stephanie Griffith-Jones, Matthias Kollatz-Ahnen, Lars Andersen and 
Signe Hansen 2012 and Terry McKinley, Giovanni Cozzi, Jo Michell, and Hannah Bargawi 
2013a, among others). 
Using a detailed macroeconomic model in this paper we complement the existing 
empirical evidence by developing a gendered perspective on employment-based economic 
recovery. This is of particular importance in light of increased evidence that current austerity 
policies in Europe are likely to disproportionately disadvantage women via their roles in the 
labor market (see e.g. Maria Karamessini and Jill Rubery 2013 and Francesca Bettio et al. 
2013).  
In order to achieve this objective, our paper compares and contrasts two alternative 
scenarios for Europe: an austerity scenario and a gendered expansionary macroeconomic 
scenario. In the austerity scenario we assume that the current fundamental direction of 
austerity policies is maintained to 2030 while in our gendered expansionary macroeconomic 
scenario we use government spending and investment, and private investment to reach 
specific targets for female and male employment.  In other words, we assume that 
governments do not drastically cut public investment and expenditure and that private 
investment significantly increases in an effort to generate the economic momentum required 
to substantially raise employment levels for both men and women.  
The focus of this paper is on the Eurozone and the United Kingdom. We divide the 
Eurozone into two blocs: Core Eurozone (Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, Luxemburg 
and The Netherlands) and Eurozone Periphery (Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece). 
Eurozone countries have been aggregated on the basis of similar macroeconomic conditions. 
Further, we keep the Eurozone Periphery as an individual bloc as it exhibits much lower rates 
of female employment compared to the Core Eurozone.  
Results generated by the CAM model for the gendered expansionary macroeconomic 
scenario project significantly higher levels of both male and female employment than the 
austerity scenario and thus lead to a significant reduction in the employment gap between 
men and women. The reduction in the employment gap between men and women in our 
alternative scenario also has positive effects on both labor productivity and on the available 
amount of government spending per dependent. In addition, the combination of higher levels 
of growth and increased government revenue lead to a significant reduction in both 
government debt and fiscal deficits in our scenario. As such the gendered expansionary 
macroeconomic scenario cannot be dismissed on the basis of fiscal profligacy or for 
generating excessive government debt. 
Thus, we conclude by arguing that a gender-aware expansionary macroeconomic 
framework for Europe is indeed economically viable and it provides significantly better 
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perspectives not only in terms of job creation for women and men but also in terms of debt 
reduction and fiscal balances.  
While there is a growing literature on the impact of austerity on men and women, and 
alternative proposals to narrow the employment gap between men and women this paper 
makes an original contribution in that it is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to quantify and 
assess the overall economic feasibility of a gender-sensitive expansionary macroeconomic 
strategy for Europe. 
 
2. What do we know about the impact of the crisis and austerity policies on men and 
women in Europe’s labor market? 
Initially, the global financial crisis led to a decline in domestic and global demand in male-
dominated manufacturing, construction, and financial sectors. However, as crisis turned to 
recession across Europe, secondary impacts via private sector demand have been less gender-
specific, affecting a range of industries and leading to job cuts, wage freezes and increased 
job insecurity for both men and women (Stephanie Seguino 2010; Karamessini and Rubery 
2013). A further dimension to these first and second-round job cuts is pointed out by Seguino 
(2010), making use of results from latest round of the World Values Survey. In developed as 
well as developing countries gender norms around who has a greater right to a job often 
persist, so that ‘women are frequently fired first, because men are perceived to be the 
legitimate jobholders when jobs are scarce.’ (Seguino 2010: 181) 
Examples from Italy (Alina Verashchagina and Marina Capparucci 2013), Spain (Elvira 
Gago and Marcelo Kirzner 2013), and Greece (Maria Karamessini 2013), while 
demonstrating the variety in the channels and intensity of impacts of the crisis, also highlight 
a number of trends and commonalities regarding gender aspects. In general, the crisis has 
stalled progress towards gender equality, both in terms of pay and conditions as well as 
reducing the absolute number of women in formal employment. Where a narrowing of gender 
equality has taken place this has, unfortunately, been achieved ‘through the deterioration of 
employment and social conditions for both men and women.’ (Karamessini 2013: 183) 
Despite the significant deterioration in employment opportunities for both men and 
women as a result of the global crisis and recession, policy responses across Europe, 
following temporary, piece-meal and early attempts at fiscal stimulus, have focused on fiscal 
containment and debt reduction rather than promoting growth and job creation (Bettio et al 
2013: 120). The preoccupation with fiscal deficits and government debts has led governments 
to implement harsh austerity policies in order to significantly reduce government 
expenditures, with negative repercussions on public sector employment, welfare and public 
investment. Isabel Ortiz and Matthew Cummins (2013) conduct a review of austerity 
measures across 181 countries, relying on IMF country reports published since 2010 to 
document policies across the following seven categories: i) eliminating or reducing subsidies; 
ii) cutting or capping the wage bill; iii) increasing consumption and sales taxes;  iv) 
reforming old age pension, usually to increase the age of eligibility for men and women; v) 
rationalising safety nets; vi) healthcare systems reform; vii) labor flexibilization reform (e.g. 
removal or minimum wages).  Table 1 summarizes their results.  
 
INSERT Table 1: Review of austerity measures across Europe 
 
Missing from Ortiz and Cummins (2013a) original analysis is an assessment of how 
policies under the above categories affect different groups of people within each country, 
including women as opposed to men. However, an updated study by the authors (2013b), 
does highlight the ways in which vulnerable groups are impacted by each of the above 
categories within developing countries. They conclude as follows.  
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“The adverse effects of the main austerity measures being adopted were also likely 
to be disproportionately felt by children and women: wage bill reductions can 
hamper the delivery and quality of essential health, nutrition, and education goods 
and services, especially in rural areas; subsidy reversals can make food, transport, 
and other basic goods unaffordable; and rationalizing social protection schemes, 
including pension benefits, runs a high risk of exclusion at a time when children 
and women are most in need.” (Isabel Ortiz and Matthew Cummins 2013b: 73) 
 
There has been a gradual recognition among gender experts that such policies are 
significantly shifting the burden of debt and budget deficit adjustment on to women in both 
developed and developing countries (Seguino 2010; Zita Gurmai 2013; Karamessini and 
Rubery 2013; UNISON 2014). The European Women’s Lobby (EWL) (2012) has detailed 
the ways in which women across Europe have been acutely affected by such austerity policies 
both inside and outside the labor market. In many instances cut-backs to state-provided care 
services are seeing women return to their traditional gender roles, stepping out of formal 
employment to take over caring responsibilities no longer funded by the state. The EWL 
(2012) report also highlights the increasing precariousness of lone mothers and female 
pensioners, due to their heightened reliance on state-funded services, currently under threat 
from cut-backs.  
Beyond the direct impacts via the labor market, there are a number of ways in which 
women are impacted by austerity policies indirectly as well. Increases in the retirement age, 
the removal of or tightening of criteria relating to certain benefits (e.g. housing benefit), and 
the rise in out-of-pocket health spending are all additional examples of ways in which 
expenditure cuts are hitting households, and women in particular, outside of the labor market.  
For example, current pension reforms in the case of Greece (Karamessini 2013) demonstrate 
the way in which women are penalised as a result of having shorter and irregular work 
histories.   
The focus on this paper in on assessing the impact of austerity policies on men and 
women via the labor market, in particular, and on demonstrating what an alternative 
framework for Europe might look like. We therefore focus the following discussion of 
gendered labor market impacts under two main headings (i) direct public sector employment 
impacts, and ii) indirect public spending effects, before identifying the roots of an alternative 
framework that moves away from austerity economics.   
 
Public sector employment impacts 
Cuts in government expenditure have led to a further reduction in female-dominated public 
sector jobs and pay. Even early indications from a study conducted in 2010-11 in four 
countries in Europe, indicated that public sector job cuts have been a widespread feature of 
austerity policies, with women disproportionately affected (European Federation of Public 
Service Unions 2011). Recruitment freezes or job cuts have also resulted in increased 
working intensity (longer hours, fewer holidays, and less family-friendly shift patterns) for 
those remaining in employment. Women have been disproportionately affected by such 
changes. (see Gago and Kirzner 2013 for examples of this in the Spanish context).  
A brief glance at more recent EUROSTAT data reveals the opposing trends regarding 
male and female public sector employment across the Eurozone. In the Core Eurozone male 
full-time public sector employment (MFTPSE) has declined moderately since 2010. In 2013 
levels were 97% of the pre-austerity levels of 2010. In the Eurozone Periphery the falls in 
MFTPSE have been more dramatic, reaching just 92% of 2010 levels in 2013. However, 
across both regions part-time public sector employment has increased for males. In the Core 
5 
 
Eurozone the increase in male part-time public sector employment (MPTPSE) has been 
moderate but in the South Eurozone such as increase has been particularly relevant, rising to 
above 120% of 2010 levels in 2013.  
Of interest to us, are the different trajectories followed by female counterparts in the 
Core and Periphery Eurozone. While female full-time public sector employment (FFTPSE) 
has remained stable in the Core Eurozone, FFTPSE in the Eurozone Periphery has declined 
almost as sharply as for men. However, in contrast to the situation for men, female part-time 
public sector employment (FPTPSE) has not risen in the same way as for men in this region. 
Instead levels of FPTPSE have only witnessed a marginal increase.  
 
INSERT Figure 1: Public sector employment in the Eurozone (2010-2013) 
 
The above data suggests a sharp gender contrast in public sector employment in the 
Eurozone Periphery. While male full-time employment in the public sector has declined, part-
time employment has made up for some of these falls. It would appear that, however, such 
part-time employment in the public sector has not played the same role for women laid off 
from full-time employment in the public sector in the Eurozone Periphery.  
Considering trends in the public sector gender pay gap can help us further understand 
the gender dimension to public sector cuts. The unadjusted Gender Pay Gap (GPG) represents 
the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female 
paid employees as a percentage of average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees. As 
such a reduction in the GPG represents progress towards equal pay between men and women. 
Table 2 below highlights the progress achieved regarding the GPG in the public sector since 
2008 (in this instance the health and education sectors in countries for which such data is 
available). Across all countries (with the exception of Spain), the GPG in the public sector 
has been on the decline. A closer look, however, reveals that such progress has stalled since 
austerity measures were adopted in 2010. A simple average reveals that progress towards 
equal pay is in jeopardy in both the Eurozone Periphery and Core, with countries such as 
Ireland, Spain and France showing particularly worrying trends.  
 
INSERT Table 2: The gender pay gap in the public sector in Europe (2008-2012) 
 
 
Public spending effects 
Cuts in care-related spending or increased eligibility criteria for receiving support towards 
(child and/or elderly) care costs and family benefits have hit women in the labor market in 
particular. Many have reduced their work commitments or have left the labor market entirely 
as a result of such an increase in costs (Karamessini and Rubery 2013). Eurostat data 
indicates a general reduction in public spending across the Eurozone countries and the UK, 
with Eurozone Periphery countries witnessing stronger reductions in public expenditure since 
2010. This picture can be broken down further.  
 Spending on old-age services has remained relatively stable across all countries. 
Similarly spending on health services, in general has remained around 14%-16% of GDP 
across Eurozone countries (Eurostat 2014). However, once data on spending per person are 
considered different trajectories emerge in the Periphery and Core Eurozone. While in the 
Core Eurozone health spending per person per annum has increased from an average of 
€2730 in 2010 to €2900 in 2012, in the Eurozone Periphery there has been an average 
reduction of health spending per person from €1730 in 2010 to €1560 in 2012.  
Spending on children’s services and education has followed a similar trajectory. While 
spending on family and child services has remained relatively stable over the last few years, 
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education spending per child has been reduced by a significant margin in Eurozone Periphery 
countries. While in the Eurozone Core average public education spending per child (under 
15) per annum has increased marginally year on year since 2008, in the Eurozone Periphery 
countries such spending has, on average, been reduced from €7540 in 2010 to €6760 in 2012 
per child per annum.    
The impacts of such a reduction in spending on essential public services on female 
employment can be seen in the data on discouraged workers. In the Eurozone periphery 
female workers have been particularly discouraged from (re)entering the jobs market since 
2010. While in 2010 the percentage of discouraged workers in the Eurozone Periphery 
represented around 5.6% of the total active population, by 2013 that figure had reached 7.2%.  
 
INSERT Table 3: Female discouraged workers2 as a % of total active population 
(2008-2012) 
 
The overall picture that emerges from the above consultation of recent literature and data is 
an unambiguous one. Austerity policies are beginning to expose clear gender divisions, 
especially in the Eurozone Periphery. Women are feeling the impact of such policies both 
directly, via their reduced employment in the public sector but also indirectly via the 
reduction of public sector spending on crucial care, health and education services that have, 
in the past, supported working women. Given this status-quo it is crucial that we highlight the 
nature and content of a gendered alternative to austerity economics.  
 
Developing alternative policies further from a gender-perspective 
A significant discussion on alternative policy proposals for economic recovery has recently 
emerged from a number of different arenas. These proposals are based on the recognition that 
austerity policies are detrimental for Europe and that jobs and growth are created only with 
the adoption of an expansionary macroeconomic framework (see Nitika Bagaria, Dawn 
Holland and John Van Reenen 2012; Michael Dauderstaedt and Ernst Hillebrandt 2013; 
McKinley et al. 2013a; Griffith-Jones et al. 2012; and McKinley and Cozzi 2011). A 
particularly illuminating aspect of this research have been attempts, using the CAM as well as 
other macroeconomic models, to demonstrate the medium to long-term desirability of 
adopting alternative macroeconomic policies in Europe, for growth and job creation in 
general. However, currently missing from the above studies, have been attempts to estimate 
the potential gender impacts of different policy scenarios.  
Concurrently to the above research agenda, a number of feminist scholars have begun 
to demonstrate what a progressive, feminist alternative to continued austerity might constitute 
in concrete policy terms (Claire Annesley 2014; Diane Perrons and Ania Plomien 2013; 
Women’s Budget Group 2012). In the UK, the Women’s Budget Group (2012) has devised a 
so-called F-Plan. This alternative, feminist plan for recovery outlines policies that stimulates 
job creation by putting money in the hands of poorer and middle-income people and invests 
in social as well as physical infrastructure. The F-plan covers tangible measures to reverse 
current and planned expenditure cuts of the UK government by reintroducing important 
benefits, such as child care allowances and pensioner benefits. The F-plan also outlines 
important progressive revenue-raising policies, supporting an international financial 
transaction tax and raising taxes from higher income earners. Finally, the F-plan details how 
financial and investment policies can be made more gender-equitable, for example via the 
rebalancing of investments towards social and human infrastructure as well as physical 
infrastructure. These concrete proposals are an important addition to current debates around 
                                                          
2 Discouraged workers are identified as persons available to work but not seeking work.  
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the impact of the financial crisis and austerity policies on men and women in Europe. Such 
policy proposals also fill the gender-gap identified among those working on macroeconomic 
policies for broad-based recovery in Europe.  
Finally, it is important to note the progress made regarding the engendering of 
macroeconomic models among feminist scholars. Recent works by Elissa Braunstein, Irene 
Van Staveren and Daniela Tavani (2011) and Marzia Fontana (2014) demonstrate the limits 
of traditional macroeconomic models of the economy and the limits to investigating gender 
as merely an add-on to traditional categories of analysis. Braunstein, Van Staveren and 
Tavani (2011) offer an important addition to the literature in this field by formally modelling 
the unpaid care sector as part of the economic system. In general, attempts to engender 
macroeconomic models have remained within the realm of the short to medium term. 
Therefore very little can be said on the basis of this (mostly theoretical) work about concrete 
changes in policies and gendered outcomes in the longer-term. This article, by making use of 
a non-conventional macroeconomic model, hopes to add to this research by providing a 
longer-term perspective.  
This article intends to borrow from the different strands of research discussed above, and 
build on the research and policy status quo. The intention is to investigate the engendering of 
the general macroeconomic alternatives to continued austerity, by implementing the measures 
and policies emerging from feminist scholarship. As such, the article is able to demonstrate 
the economic feasibility of a gender-equitable macroeconomic scenario that puts long-term 
growth and job creation at its heart.   
 
3. The Cambridge-Alphametrics model (CAM) 
In section 2 we presented some of the gendered impacts of current austerity policies via labor 
market outcomes in the short to medium-term, relying on currently available Eurostat data 
and evidence from secondary literature. But what are the broader, long-term consequences of 
continued austerity versus alternative policy measures? We hope to answer this question by 
making use of a global macroeconomic model that allows us to compare and contrast 
opposing policy scenarios. While this model does not allow us to consider the long-term 
gender outcomes in specific sectors, it does allow us to investigate the impacts of different 
policies on men and women in the labor market and on broader economic variables in each of 
our countries of interest.  
 
The Cambridge-Alphametrics Model (CAM) of the world economy is a non-conventional 
global macroeconomic model that is primarily used to make medium- to long-term 
projections of historical trends of the global economy, blocs of countries, and major 
individual countries. This macro-model does not have any single, well-defined equilibrium 
path to which the world economy tends to return in the medium or long-term. Being an open 
disequilibrium system, a wide variety of outcomes may be simulated with different growth 
rates and end points (Francis Cripps 2014).3  
CAM projections draw on continuous historical data from 1970 to the most current year 
available for model variables (2012 for this exercise). The databank holds series in US dollar 
values and other units disseminated by UN organizations. 
In CAM the world economy is regarded as an integrated system in which the behaviour 
of different countries and blocs differs and changes progressively through time because of 
their specific situation in terms of geography, level of development, financial position, and so 
forth. The macro-model has a common set of identities and behavioural equations for all 
blocs to reflect the notion that they are part of the same world economy. This common 
                                                          
3 This section draws expensively from Cripps (2014). 
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schema allows for panel estimation methods, which are advantageous when there is 
considerable variation in the accuracy of series from different groups of countries and time 
periods (Cripps 2014). 
Behavioural equations are specified with functional forms that make it possible for 
responses in different parts of the world and at different levels of development to be modelled 
with common structural parameters with explicit identifications of the main reasons for 
differences between blocs. Techniques that facilitate use of the common schema include bloc 
specific intercepts and error variances, error-correction dynamics, and transformation and 
scaling of variables (Cripps 2014). 
Unless behavioural constraints are introduced into the model, aggregate demand and 
technical progress are the principal drivers of economic growth. Thus, growth rate is best 
understood as reflecting growth of aggregate investment and government spending in the 
world as a whole. These variables in turn reflect confidence and expectations on the one hand 
(private investment) and policy on the other (government spending) (Cripps 2014). 
The model structure is implemented by equations fixing the value of a large number of 
macro-economic variables for each bloc and year, some of which are identities (i.e. the 
equation must always hold exactly) and other behavioural in nature with residual terms that 
represent departures from normal regular behaviours specified by constants and explanatory 
variables with structural coefficients determined by panel estimation (Cripps 2014). 
  Below we report some of the core variables and equations of the CAM model which 
form the basis of the scenarios built in this paper.  
 
Income and expenditure 
Gross national income Y is distributed and spent by government and the private sector. The 
source of gross national income are output (GDP), net receipts of income and transfers from 
other countries and additions to or subtractions from domestic purchasing power arising from 
changes in the external terms of trade. 
 
Private disposable income is defined as national income not absorbed by the government: 
 
(1) 𝑌𝑝 = 𝑌 − 𝑌𝑔 
  
Private consumption expenditure is determined by income and savings behaviour: 
 
(2) 𝐶 = 𝑌𝑝 − 𝑆𝑝  
 
The saving rate responds to changes in income Yp and wealth Wp and is influenced by 
inflation and short-term interest rate.  
 
Private fixed investment shows a standard accelerator pattern responding to the rate of growth 
of GDP dlog(V) and financial conditions such as the rate of bank lending, ILN, and the real 
bond rate, irm:  
 
(3)  𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝐼𝑝
𝑉−1 − 0.05
⁄ ) = 𝑓(− log(𝐼𝑃−1/𝑉−2 −
0.5), +𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑉), +
𝐼𝐿𝑁−1
𝑉−1
⁄  , −𝑖𝑟𝑚,  𝑎𝑏 , 𝑒𝑏 )  
 
 The symbols ab and eb denote the bloc-specific intercepts (long-run values) and disturbances. 
 
Government accounts 
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Changes in government debt Lg depend on the balance between government spending and 
revenue and on asset transactions and write-offs and holding gains and losses. Government 
income Yg (revenue less subsidies, transfers and interest payments), is limited to 40% or less 
of prior year national income Y-1 and responds positively to increases in national income Y, 
especially in the first year. Other factors influencing government income in the long run are 
the inherited stock of debt LG/Y and cost of financing the debt including the impact of real 
bond rates irm: 
 
(4) −𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
0.4 𝑌−1
𝑌𝑔 − 1⁄ ) = 𝑓(+ log (
0.4𝑌−2
𝑌𝑔−1 − 1
⁄ ) , +𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌), −𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑌−1),  
+ log (
𝐿𝐺−1
𝑌−1
⁄ ) , −𝑖𝑟𝑚−1  
𝐿𝑔−1
𝑌−1
⁄ , 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏) 
 
 Government spending on goods and services G responds to the level and rate of change of 
government income Yg and tends to rise with population N. Government spending is also 
adjusted in response to the inherited debt burden LG-1/Y-1, and the external current account 
CA$-1/Y$-1: 
 
(5) 𝑑 log(𝐺) =
𝑓(− log 𝐺−1), +𝑑 log(𝑌𝑔), + 
𝑌𝑔−1
𝑌−1
⁄ , + log( 𝑁−1), − log(
𝐿𝐺−1
𝑌−1
⁄ ), + 
𝐶𝐴$−1
𝑌$−1
⁄ , 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏 
 
The financial balance or ‘net lending’ of government NLg = Yg – G represents the difference 
between income and spending on goods and services. 
 
Population and employment 
Employment of women NEF and men NEM is a function of potential labor supply represented 
by population aged 15 -64 (NWP) and fluctuations in GDP growth dlog(V) with an elasticity 
that increases with relative per capita income YR. Other factors are the size of the child 
population NCP and the degree of urbanization NUR affecting female and male employment, 
respectively4. A transformation is applied to ensure that the proportion of employed lies 
within a range of 15-70% for women and 49-95% for men: 
 
(6) 𝑑(𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑓) =
𝑓(−𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑓−1 , − log (
𝑁𝐶𝑃−1
𝑁−1
⁄ ), + 𝑌𝑅−1 𝑑 log 𝑉  , + 𝑌𝑅−1 𝑑 log(𝑉−1), 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏 
 
(7) 𝑑(𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑚) =
𝑓(−𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑚−1 , − log (
𝑁𝑈𝑅−1
𝑁−1
⁄ ), + 𝑌𝑅−1 𝑑 log 𝑉  , + 𝑌𝑅−1 𝑑 log(𝑉−1), 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏 
 
Where 𝑁𝐸𝐴𝑥 = log 𝑁𝐸𝑥 (⁄ 𝑁𝑊𝑃𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛)/(𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛) − 1)  
 
Natural increases in population up to 2030 are treated as predetermined (using UN Population 
Division median estimates). Population projections are however affected by net migration 
NIM which responds to relative per capita income YR and employment growth dlog(NE) with 
considerable momentum implied by the lagged dlog term: 
 
                                                          
4 For a full explanation of the determinants of male and female employment, see Cripps 2014. 
10 
 
(8) 𝑑 log(1 + 𝑁𝐼𝑀
𝑁𝐸−1) = 𝑓(− log 1 + 𝑁𝐼𝑀−1 𝑁𝐸−2), +𝑑 log(⁄ 1 + 𝑁𝐼𝑀−1 𝑁𝐸−2⁄ ), + 𝑌𝑅−1 ,
+ 𝑑 log(𝑁𝐸), 𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑏
⁄   
 
Migration projections, like other international exchanges, are adjusted to make sure that net 
migration is zero for the world as a whole (Cripps 2014). 
 
4. Scenario assumptions and specifications 
This paper compares and contrasts two alternatives for Europe for the period to 2030. The 
first scenario assumes the continuation of past trends and current austerity policies without 
any significant innovation in European politics (Austerity scenario). This scenario is then 
contrasted with a Gendered Expansionary Macroeconomic scenario which assumes a 
rollback of current austerity policies and that gendered reflationary fiscal policies together 
with private investment are the key drivers for stimulating future growth and creating jobs for 
men and women in Europe. We now review the core assumptions underpinning the two 
scenarios under investigation. 
  
Austerity scenario 
In the austerity scenario we assume that governments in the Eurozone and in the United 
Kingdom will continue to cut expenditures in an attempt to reduce budget deficits and bring 
their debt-to-GDP ratio down to 60%, in line with the Growth and Stability Pact. In order to 
achieve this, we impose targets for the ratio of government expenditure to GDP (GV) for the 
Core Eurozone, Eurozone Periphery, and for the United Kingdom (Table 4).  
 
INSERT Table 4: Target government expenditure5 as percentage of GDP under austerity 
and historical values 
 
The 2030 targets for government expenditure to GDP are 21% for the Core Eurozone, 
20% for the United Kingdom, and 19% for the Eurozone Periphery. This represents a 
reduction in government expenditure from the period 2012 to 2030 of 13% for the Core 
Eurozone, 20% for the United Kingdom and of 24% for the Eurozone Periphery. 
In addition to cuts in government expenditure, and in order to further decrease fiscal 
deficits, we also assume modest increases in government revenue in the Eurozone Periphery 
and in the United Kingdom.  
 
 
INSERT Table 5: Target government income as percentage of GDP under austerity 
and historical values 
 
The 2030 targets for the ratio of government net income to GDP (YgV) are 20% for the 
Eurozone Periphery and 19% for the United Kingdom, up from 18% in 2014 in both blocs.. 
                                                          
5 Government expenditure excludes transfer payments such as social security and pensions. Thus the ratios shown are considerably smaller 
than the gross figure usually quoted. 
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The 2030 target of government net income to GDP for the Core Eurozone is 20% and the 
starting level in 2012 is also 20%6.  
In the austerity scenario we also assume that private investment will continue its 
historical trend into the future and thus remains subdued in the face of sluggish GDP growth 
and depressed expectations of profitability. As such, we do not programme for any specific 
target (boost) for private investment as percentage of GPD (IpV) by 2030 and instead we 
project the historical trends into the future for all the blocs under investigation.  
 
Gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario  
In our gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario we assume that government 
investment and expenditure together with private investment are the key drivers for 
stimulating future growth and for generating jobs for both men and women. Thus, in this 
scenario we roll back austerity policies, maintain or even increase government investment, as 
government expenditure is not drastically cut as in the austerity scenario, and we also assume 
increased private investment. Government expenditure and investment, together with private 
investment, are then marshalled towards employment generation for both women and men. 
The key target variable in this scenario is the ratio of the employed to working-age 
population (NERW). We calibrate the size of investment and fiscal stimulus in order to 
achieve a desirable, but also feasible, level of this ratio for the three blocs. Table 6 shows the 
2030 target, the intermediate 2020 target (to allow comparison with the EU 2020 strategy 
targets) and the historical values, for employed to working-age population for the Core 
Eurozone, the Eurozone Periphery, and the United Kingdom. 
 
  
                                                          
6 The slight increases in government new income in the Eurozone Periphery and the United Kingdom are assumed to originate from 
clamping down on tax evasion and tax fraud, and from the introduction or increases in indirect taxation, such as VAT. See Ortiz and 
Cummins 2013a for the full range of policies across these countries. However, we do not assume any increase in government net income to 
GDP for the Core Eurozone as its fiscal position is viable at the beginning of the period under investigation. . 
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INSERT Table 6: Employment as percentage of working-age-population: targets and 
historical levels  
 
In case of the Core Eurozone and the United Kingdom the employment targets for 2030 
are 79% and 77% respectively. The intermediate 2020 target is 73% for both the Core 
Eurozone and the United Kingdom. This intermediate target for the Core Eurozone is in in 
line with the European Commission Europe 2020 estimated EU target of 73-74% (European 
Commission 2013). The United Kingdom has not set up any employment target for 2020. 
However, we use the 2020 target for the Core Eurozone as a proxy for establishing the 
intermediate target for this country. 
The 2030 employment target for the Eurozone Periphery is 71% and the intermediate 
target in 2020 is 64%. The intermediate target for this bloc is lower than the Europe 2020 
employment target. The European Commission estimates an average employment target for 
this bloc of 71% in 2020 (European Commission 2013). However, given the persistent 
recessionary conditions in the Eurozone Periphery, the low expectations of profitability under 
continued austerity policies, and the historical trend of the past decade, we believe that the 
target set up by the European Commission for this bloc in 2020 is far too optimistic. 
In addition, in our gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario, we programme for a 
disproportionate increase in female employment vis-à-vis male employment. In other words, 
we assume that government spending and investment is directed more towards the creation of 
jobs for women than men. Thus, the assumed growth rate of the ratio of female employment 
to female working-age population (NERFW) is higher than the growth rate of male 
employment to male working-age population (NERMW). Table 7 shows the targets for 
female employment as a percentage of female working-age population and for male 
employment as a percentage of male working-age population.  
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INSERT Table 7: female and male employment targets 
 
These employment targets are achieved through a combination of reflationary fiscal policies 
(maintaining or even increasing government spending and investment levels) and a 
significant rise in private investment. On the one hand, with regards to government spending, 
we let the model determine the required level to meet the employment targets. In other words, 
rather than setting specific targets for government expenditure as percentage of GDP (GV) 
we let the model identify the required level of government expenditure needed to reach the 
assumed employment targets7. 
For private investment, on the other hand, we assume exogenous increases to counter the 
declining historical trends.  
We believe that private investment will have to significantly increase from the woefully 
low levels to which it is has fallen following the financial crisis in order spearhead economic 
recovery and create jobs. Thus, we programme increases in private investments as a ratio to 
GDP (IpV) in the three blocs in order to bring them back to early 2000s levels. Table 8 shows 
the private investment targets and the historical values for the Core Eurozone, the Eurozone 
Periphery and the United Kingdom. 
INSERT Table 8: private investment targets and historical values 
 
 With regards to the financing of private investment we assume that increases in private 
investment could be financed through enhanced lending from the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) and by a better allocation of EU structural funds and the European Social Fund. These 
funds could be used for financing economically sustainable projects and activities, support 
the growth of both existing and new competitive enterprises, and especially those that provide 
skills upgrading and training for both women and men and provide family friendly working 
patters and child care.  
We believe that such a combination of reflationary fiscal policies together with increases 
in private investment should help expand the productive capacity of an economy in addition 
to stimulating aggregate demand. Further, by disproportionately redirecting government 
investment and expenditure towards supporting female employment we assume that women 
will benefit the most from the expansion of productive capacity. That is, we assume that part 
of this government expenditure and investment will be redirected towards enhancing physical 
and human capital for women, enabling them to (re)enter the labor market. 
Finally, in order to contain possible fiscal deficits that might result from the 
implementation of reflationary policies we also assume a boost in government revenue as 
percentage of GDP (YgV). For all the blocs government revenue is assumed to increase to 
22% of GDP. Increases for the Eurozone Periphery and the United Kingdom are more 
significant compared to the Core Eurozone. This is because the level of fiscal deficit for the 
Eurozone Periphery and the United Kingdom is higher than in the Core Eurozone. However, 
                                                          
7 Given that the targets for female employment are substantially higher than their initial level, compared to the male employment targets for 
all blocs, we assume that government spending will be channelled towards the creation of jobs for women to a greater degree than towards 
the creation of jobs for men. We rest this assumption on the existing empirical literature which makes the case for significant increases in 
both human and capital investment towards generating new and better employment opportunities for women across all economic sectors. 
Governments may do this by providing appropriate training and skills upgrading for women, and supporting industries that offer family 
friendly working patters and child care (see Karamessini and Rubery 2013; Women’s Budget Group 2012; Perrons and Plomien 2013; and 
Ozlem Onaran 2013 among others).  
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we believe that these are feasible targets as they are not above historical peaks (22% for the 
Eurozone Periphery in 2007 and 23% for the United Kingdom in 2000).8 
 
5. Results and Analysis 
In this section we present the projections produced by the CAM under the assumptions 
described for each of the two scenarios.  
 
Employment, welfare and economic growth 
The targets on employment to working age population (including our specific target on 
female employment to female working age population) are met in our gendered expansionary 
macroeconomic scenario. We are now interested in assessing how these targets translate into 
job creation for men and women in the Eurozone. 
The gendered employment-led economic recovery scenario achieves important gains 
both in terms of increases in total female and male compared to the austerity scenario. Table 
9 shows the total number of jobs created under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic 
scenario (alternative) and under the austerity scenario for the three blocs and the historical 
values. 
 
INSERT Table 9: Total employment (millions of persons)  
 
Under the austerity scenario total employment is projected to stagnate in both the 
Eurozone Periphery and in the United Kingdom and to decline by 1.5 million units from 2012 
to 2030 in the Core Eurozone. On the other hand, significant employment gains are achieved 
under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario. By 2030, an additional 4.5 
million jobs could be created in the Core Eurozone, whereas in the Eurozone Periphery 
additional jobs could amount to 8.4 million by 2030. Finally, in the United Kingdom a 
gendered expansionary macroeconomic framework could lead to the creation of an additional 
1.3 million jobs for women and men. Thus, we argue that the combination of private 
investment boost and reflationary fiscal policies in Eurozone could lead to significant job 
creation for women and men. 
We are now interested in assessing the effects of marshalling government expenditure 
and investment disproportionately towards supporting female employment. In other words, 
we identify how many jobs for women are created out of the increases in total employment. 
Table 10 shows total female employment under the two scenarios for the Eurozone (Core and 
Periphery) and the United Kingdom.  
  
                                                          
8 Compared with the austerity scenario, the implicit assumption behind raising government net income in this scenario, is the introduction of 
progressive tax measures (see Women’s Budget Group 2012) as compared to the regressive measures currently proposed or already 
introduced across Europe (see Ortiz and Cummins 2013a). 
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INSERT Table 10: Total female employment (in millions) 
 
In the Eurozone Periphery, where the female employment rate is initially much lower, 
compared to the North Eurozone, an additional 3.2 million jobs are created for women by 
2020, and this addition could reach 5.8 million jobs by 20309. In the Core Eurozone a total of 
0.9 million jobs for women could be created by 2020 and this could reach 2.7 million in 
2030. Finally, in the United Kingdom the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario 
could generate an additional 0.8 million jobs for women by 2030. These results are in stark 
contrast with the austerity scenario where female employment is projected to remain stable in 
the Eurozone Periphery and in the United Kingdom and even decline in the Core Eurozone. 
Overall, by redirecting government expenditure towards female employment, in the Eurozone 
Periphery 70% of new jobs created are for women and in the United Kingdom and in the 
Core Eurozone 60% of new jobs will be for women.  
Increases in female employment under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic 
scenario also lead to a significant increase in the ratio of female employment to male 
employment, in particular in the Eurozone Periphery. In this bloc, female employment as 
percentage of male employment increases from 73.8% in 2012 to 83.7% in 2030 (Table 11). 
On the other hand, female employment as percentage of male employment under the austerity 
scenario declines to 71.6% thus widening further the employment gap between men and 
women. In the United Kingdom the ratio of female employment to male employment 
declined to 85% by 2030 under the austerity scenario whereas it remains above 86% under 
the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario. Finally, in the Core Eurozone, where 
the ratio of female employment to male employment is already much higher than the other 
two blocs, the ratio further improve under the alternative scenario and it reaches 93.3% by 
2030. 
INSERT Table 11: Female employment as % of male employment 
 
Under the expansionary gendered economic scenario significant gains are also made in 
terms of GDP growth. Table 12 summarizes the projected growth rates for each scenario. 
Growth rates for the austerity scenario are much lower than the gendered expansionary 
macroeconomic scenario. In the Eurozone periphery growth rates under the gendered 
expansionary (alternative) scenario reach an average of 3.4% during the period 2019-2024 
and 3% in the period 2025-2030. These rates are much higher than the austerity scenario 
where the growth rate is projected to remain below 1% for the whole period. Growth rates for 
the Core Eurozone and the United Kingdom, under the alternative scenario are more modest 
in comparison to those achieved by the Eurozone Periphery. However, both blocs perform 
better, in terms of economic growth, compared to the austerity scenario. 
 
INSERT Table 12: Average GDP growth (%)  
 
 
Further, under our alternative scenario government spending in all blocs would increase 
faster than the number of economic dependents (young, elderly, or working age). Table 13 
shows government spending per dependent measured in PPP$ for the three blocs10. 
 
                                                          
9 The Eurozone Periphery is a major recipient of migrants from within outside the EU. The figures quoted above therefore include the inflow 
of migrants in to the working age population.  
10 See appendix I for more information regarding the results for labour productivity.  
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INSERT Table 13: Government spending per dependent at PPP$ rates 
 
In the Eurozone Periphery, for example government spending per dependent would rise 
from 10,439 PPP$ to 18,471 PPP$ under the alternative scenario. On the other hand, 
spending per dependent significantly declines under the austerity scenario. In the United 
Kingdom the corresponding increase would be from 15,149 PPP$ in 2012 to 17,858 PPP$ in 
2020 and in the Core Eurozone government spending per dependent would increase by 
almost 5,000 PPP$ by 2030. Thus, governments would improve their capacity to provide 
social protection and benefits to dependents under our alternative scenario. This is a crucial 
gender-aspect of our alternative scenario. Not only are jobs disproportionately created for 
women via this scenario, but, in addition, via the boost in targeted government spending, 
male and female dependents are further supported. The CAM does not provide a break-down 
of such spending by area but this may cover additional spending on care for children and 
elderly dependents as well as boosting allowances for non-working partners. The boost to 
such services inevitably also leads to the creation of further jobs for men and women within 
these sectors. This lends further support to our alternative scenario, compared to the business-
as-usual case.  
 
Government balances 
The gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario assumes that both private investment 
and government expenditure are marshalled to target significant increases in both female and 
male employment. Whilst changes in private investment are determined exogenously on the 
basis of historical data, government expenditure is estimated by the model. Table 14 shows 
the projected government spending as percentage of GDP to 2030 and the historical trends for 
the three blocs. 
 
INSERT Table 14: Government spending as % of GDP 
     
Under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic (alternative) framework government 
spending as percentage of GDP for the Core Eurozone slightly declines from 24.6% to 23.1% 
in 2030. In the United Kingdom the reduction of government spending to GDP is more 
moderate compared to the austerity scenario where it reaches 19.5% by 2030. In the 
Eurozone Periphery government expenditure increases to 25.8% by 2020 and subsequently 
declines by one percentage point by 2030. Overall, the gendered expansionary 
macroeconomic framework cannot be dismissed on the basis of fiscal profligacy. Instead a 
slower pace fiscal consolidation, especially in the Eurozone Periphery, could lead to higher 
levels of growth and more jobs for both women and men (see Appendix II for the longer-term 
implications for government debt).  
 
Overall, the comparison of the austerity scenario with a gendered expansionary 
macroeconomic scenario reveals that the continuation of austerity policies, which translate in 
to significant cuts in government spending and investment, might lead to further stagnation in 
private investment, low growth rates across Europe, and more importantly it will impair job 
creation for both men and women. Further, continued austerity policies could lead to a 
stagnation of female employment and to a further deterioration of the ratio of female 
employment to male employment, thus further widening the employment gap. In contrast, a 
strategy of combining reflationary fiscal policies, increases in private investment, and 
carefully redirecting a significant part of government spending and investment towards the 
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creation of jobs for women could have strong positive effects both in terms of employment 
generation and economic growth. 
 
6. Concluding remarks and ways forward  
It is increasingly evident that continued austerity policies are doing more harm than good for 
the economies and societies of Europe. However, the impact on gender equality is still to be 
fully understood. In particular, the multitude of channels and mechanisms through which 
women and men continue to be impacted by fiscal retrenchment makes drawing firm 
conclusions on the direction and severity of impacts difficult to determine. 
This policy brief intended to make a modest contribution to this debate by tackling the 
impact of current austerity policies on employment in two Eurozone blocs, and by 
highlighting the economic implications of an alternative gender-focused employment-led 
policy approach.  
  
Crucially, the analysis presented here shows that the aims of economic growth and 
increased employment targeted at women can be achieved via the adoption of gender-
sensitive expansionary macroeconomic policies. Such a macroeconomic strategy is 
economically feasible, leading to substantial gains in terms of job creation for both women 
and men, as well as accelerated growth and debt reduction. Thus, the recommendation that 
stems from this analysis is to roll back current austerity policies and embark on a new gender-
sensitive expansionary economic trajectory. 
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Appendix I: Results and analysis of labor productivity  
In addition to analysing employment and economic growth outcomes, we also compare 
increases in employment to increases in labor productivity. It is indeed desirable that 
economic policies produce a significant expansion in employment but not at the costs of 
losses in labor productivity. The ideal situation would be an improvement in both (McKinley 
et al. 2013a). Table A1 shows labor productivity, measured as GDP per person employed at 
PPP rates.  
 
INSERT Table A1: Labor productivity, GDP per person employed at PPP rates 
 
Under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario labor productivity 
significantly rises. The most dramatic increases would occur in the Core Eurozone and in the 
Eurozone Periphery where GDP per person employed would reach 100,317 PPP$ and 95,867 
PPP$ respectively by 2030. Also the United Kingdom records significant increases its labor 
productivity. By 2030 GDP per person employed in the United Kingdom wold reach 94,237 
PPP$. Thus, the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario achieves important gains 
not only in terms of job creation but also in terms of labor productivity. 
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Appendix II: Results and analysis of government debt  
In order to contain future government deficits our gendered expansionary 
macroeconomic scenario also assumes a boost in government income, in conjunction with the 
projected trend of government expenditure. For the three blocs we assume that net 
government income as a ratio to GDP rises to 22% by 2030. Table A2 shows the fiscal 
balance as percentage of GDP for the three blocs under the two scenarios considered. 
 
INSERT Table A2: Fiscal balance as % of GDP 
 
The combination of higher levels of growth and increases in government revenue in the 
gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario leads to an improvement in the government 
deficit, to around -3% of GDP in the Eurozone Periphery, and -1% in the Core Eurozone and 
in the United Kingdom  by 2030. The improvement in the Eurozone Periphery is much more 
modest than the austerity scenario, where fiscal deficit is eliminated by 2030. However, the 
latter is achieved at the expense of lower GDP growth and less employment.  
 
As a result of the trends in government expenditure and revenue, as well as the increases in 
GDP growth, government debt as a percentage of GDP declines more sharply in the gendered 
alternative scenario than in the austerity scenario for all the blocs (Table A3). 
  
INSERT Table A3: Government debt as % of GDP 
 
 
In the South Eurozone government debt sharply declines to 82% of GDP by 2030 under 
the alternative scenario compared to 106.8% of GDP under the austerity scenario. Thus, we 
argue that a scenario of continued austerity in the South Eurozone would not only lead to 
stagnation of employment and inadequate growth rates, but would also fail to significantly 
reduce government debt. This is the case also for the United Kingdom where the debt to GDP 
ratio, under the gendered expansionary macroeconomic scenario, declines from 100% in 
2012 to 62.5% in 2030. In the Core Eurozone, under the austerity scenario, debt to GDP ratio 
increase to 71% by 2030 whilst under the alternative scenario it remains below 60%.  
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Tables and Figures - Engendering Economic Recovery:  
Modelling Alternatives to Austerity in Europe 
 
 
Table 1: Review of austerity measures across Europe 
Half-page table 
Source: adapted from Ortiz and Cummins (2003a) 
 
Country  
Reducing 
subsidies 
Wage bill 
cuts/caps 
Increasing 
consumption 
taxes 
Pension 
Rationalising 
and 
targeting 
safety nets 
Health Labour 
Reform 
reform reform 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
              
Greece x x x x x x x 
Italy x x x x x x x 
Ireland x x x x x x x 
Portugal x x x x x x x 
Spain x x x x x x x 
Central 
Eurozone 
              
Austria x 
  
x 
 
x   
Belgium x x x x x x x 
France 
 
x x x x x x 
Germany 
  
x x x x   
Luxembourg 
  
x x x x x 
Netherlands x x x x x x x 
  
      
  
UK x x x x       
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Figure 1: Public sector employment in the Eurozone (2010-2013) 
See excel file – fig 1 
Full page figure 
 
Source: EUROSTAT 2014 ‘Full-time and part-time 
employment by sex and economic activity’.
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Table 2: The gender pay gap in the public sector in Europe (2008-2012) 
Half-page table 
Source: EUROSTAT 2014 ‘Structure of Earnings Survey’ 
 
GEO/TIME 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Ireland 24.9 23.7 21.1 19.6 23.3 
Greece na na na na na 
Spain 17.1 17.8 17.4 18.2 18.2 
Italy na na na na na 
Portugal 24.3 25.3 24.2 23.3 20.7 
United Kingdom 24.6 25.1 23.8 23.8 23.4 
Belgium 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.1 6 
Germany 18.6 17.8 17.1 17 16.4 
France 17.2 15.9 16.1 14.8 16.4 
Luxembourg 9.1 7.5 6 6 5.2 
Netherlands 19.7 19.4 18.9 17.9 17 
Austria na na na na na 
EZ Periphery simple average 22.1 22.2 20.9 20.3 20.7 
EZ Core (and UK) simple 
average 
15.9 15.3 14.7 14.2 14 
 
Table 3: Female discouraged workers11 as % of total active population (2008-2012) 
Half-page table 
Source: EUROSTAT 2014 ‘Full-time and part-time employment by sex and economic 
activity’. 
GEO/TIME 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Ireland 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.6 
Greece 1.7 2 2 2.3 2.9 3.3 
Spain 5.6 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.7 7.2 
Italy 16.8 15.9 16.6 16.8 17.2 17.5 
Portugal 1.7 1.6 1.8 4 5.2 6.2 
United 
Kingdom 
2.7 2.9 3 2.8 2.9 2.7 
Belgium 1 0.9 0.9 2.5 2.2 2.3 
                                                          
11 Discouraged workers are identified as persons available to work but not seeking work.  
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Germany 2 2.2 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.6 
France 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 na 
Luxembourg 0.7 7.1 6.6 7.3 7.3 8.3 
Netherlands 3.4 3.5 3.9 3.5 3.8 4.3 
Austria 4.1 4.2 4 3.7 3.7 3.7 
EZ Periphery 5.3 5.4 5.6 6.2 6.8 7.2 
EZ Core and 
UK 
2.2 3.2 3 3.3 3.3 3.8 
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Table 4: Target government expenditure12 as percentage of GDP under austerity and 
historical values 
Half-page table 
  
Historical 
2030 Target: government  
expenditure (GV) 
Values (Austerity scenario) 
2000 2008 2012   
Core 
Eurozone 
22% 23% 25% 21% 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
20% 23% 25% 19% 
United 
Kingdom 
19% 25% 26% 20% 
 
Table 5: Target government income as percentage of GDP under austerity and historical 
values 
Half-page table 
  
Historical 
2030 Target: 
government  
income (Yg) 
Values 
(Austerity 
scenario) 
2000 2008 2012   
Core Eurozone 22.5 22 20 20% 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
19.4 18.8 16.1 20% 
United 
Kingdom 
22.9 19.2 15.6 19% 
 
  
                                                          
12 Government expenditure excludes transfer payments such as social security and pensions. Thus the ratios 
shown are considerably smaller than the gross figure usually quoted. 
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Table 6: Employment as percentage of working-age-population: targets and historical levels 
See excel file – tab 6 
Half-page table 
  
Historical Targets: 
Values 
 ratio of employed to working age 
population (NERW) 
  (Gendered expansionary 
macroeconomic scenario) 
2000 2008 2012 
2020 
2030 
(Intermediate 
target) 
Core 
Eurozone 
64% 69% 69% 73% 79% 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
57% 62% 58% 64% 71% 
United 
Kingdom 
71% 72% 70% 73% 77% 
 
Table 7: Female and male employment targets 
Half-page table 
Female employment as percentage of female 
working age population (NERFW) 
  Historical 
Targets: 
  Values 
  2000 2008 2012 2030 
Core EZ 57% 64% 65% 77% 
EZ 
Periphery 
43% 52% 50% 67% 
UK 65% 66% 65% 73% 
Male employment as percentage of male working 
age population (NERMW) 
  Historical 
Targets: 
  Values 
  2000 2008 2012 2030 
Core EZ 72% 74% 74% 81% 
EZ 
Periphery 
71% 73% 67% 76% 
UK 78% 78% 75% 81% 
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Table 8: Private investment targets and historical values 
Half-page table 
  
Historical Targets: 
Values  Private investment as % of GDP 
  
(Gendered expansionary 
macroeconomic scenario) 
2000 2008 2012 2030 
Core 
Eurozone 
19% 18% 16% 20% 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
20% 20% 14% 20% 
United 
Kingdom 
16% 14% 11% 16% 
 
Table 9: Total employment (millions of persons)  
Half-page table 
    2000 2008 2012 2020 2025 2030 
Core Eurozone 
Historical 79.08 86.29 86.29 
  
  
Austerity 
   
87.63 86.65 84.79 
Alternative 
   
89.36 89.59 89.26 
Difference       1.72 2.95 4.48 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
Historical 47.72 55.81 52.8 
  
  
Austerity 
   
52.43 52.49 52.51 
Alternative 
   
56.86 59.2 60.86 
Difference       4.42 6.72 8.35 
United Kingdom 
Historical 27.29 29.22 28.91 
  
  
austerity 
   
29.13 29.09 29.14 
alternative 
   
29.86 30.15 30.47 
difference       0.73 1.06 1.33 
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Table 10: Total female employment (in millions) 
Half-page table 
    2000 2008 2012 2020 2025 2030 
Core Eurozone 
Historical 34.8 39.49 40.16 
  
  
Austerity 
   
41.43 41.19 40.33 
Alternative 
  
42.33 42.87 43.08 
Difference     0.9 1.68 2.75 
Eurozone Periphery 
Historical 18.02 23.11 22.43 
  
  
Austerity 
   
21.95 21.89 21.91 
Alternative 
  
25.16 26.6 27.74 
Difference     3.21 4.71 5.82 
United Kingdom 
Historical 12.48 13.45 13.47 
  
  
Austerity 
   
13.54 13.45 13.38 
Alternative 
  
13.91 14.04 14.17 
Difference     0.37 0.59 0.79 
 
Table 11: Female employment as % of male employment 
Half-page table 
    2000 2008 2012 2020 2030 
Core Eurozone Historical 78.6 85.6 87.1 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
89.7 90.7 
  Alternative     90 93.3 
Eurozone Periphery Historical 60.7 70.7 73.8 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
72 71.6 
  Alternative     79.4 83.7 
United Kingdom Historical 84.3 85.3 86.9 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
86.8 84.9 
  Alternative     87.2 86.9 
 
Table 12: Average GDP growth (%)  
Half-page table 
    
2001-
2006 
2007-
2012 
2013-
2018 
2019-
2024 
2025-
2030 
Core Eurozone 
Historical 1.6 -0.7 
  
  
Austerity  
 
1.6 1.1 0.5 
Alternative   2.1 1.9 1.7 
Eurozone Periphery 
Historical 2.3 -0.7 
  
  
Austerity  
 
0 0.7 0.7 
Alternative   2.4 3.4 3 
United Kingdom 
Historical 2.9 0.2 
  
  
Austerity  
 
1 1.2 1.4 
Alternative   1.8 2 2.2 
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Table 13: Government spending per dependent at PPP$ rates 
Half-page table 
    2000 2008 2012 2020 2030 
Core Eurozone Historical 11,888 13,981 14,802 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
14,868 14,780 
  Alternative     16,488 19,737 
Eurozone Periphery Historical 8,400 11,042 10,439 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
9,036 8,395 
  Alternative     13,712 18,471 
United Kingdom Historical 10,464 15,550 15,149 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
13,580 12,832 
  Alternative     15,570 17,854 
 
Table 14: Government spending as % of GDP 
Half-page table 
    2000 2008 2012 2015 2020 2030 
Core Eurozone 
Historical 22.4 23.1 24.6 
  
  
Austerity 
   
21.7 21.6 21 
Alternative     24.1 23.3 23.1 
Eurozone Periphery 
Historical 20.3 23.3 25.4 
  
  
Austerity 
   
22.4 19.9 18.5 
Alternative     25.1 25.8 24.8 
United Kingdom 
Historical 19.7 24.7 26 
  
  
Austerity 
   
22.5 20.9 19.5 
Alternative     24.8 23.8 22.8 
 
Table A1: Labor productivity, GDP per person employed at PPP rates 
Half-page table 
    2000 2008 2012 2020 2030 
Core Eurozone Historical 69,477 73,313 73,562 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
81,735 90,527 
  Alternative     84,211 100,317 
Eurozone Periphery Historical 66,349 66,377 65,739 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
66,831 71,483 
  Alternative     75,626 95,867 
United Kingdom Historical 61,126 69,387 69,122 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
74,470 84,844 
  Alternative     77,665 94,237 
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Table A2: Fiscal balance as % of GDP 
Half-page table 
    2000 2008 2012 2020 2030 
Core Eurozone Historical 0.1 -1.1 -5.1 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
-2.3 -1 
  Alternative     -1.7 -1.1 
Eurozone Periphery Historical -0.8 -4.5 -9.3 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
-1.9 1.5 
  Alternative     -4.8 -2.9 
United Kingdom Historical 3.2 -5.4 -10.3 
 
  
  Austerity 
   
-3.7 -0.5 
  Alternative   -3.5 -1.1 
 
Table A3: Government debt as % of GDP 
Half-page table 
    2000 2008 2010 2011 2012 2020 2030 
Core Eurozone Historical 52.1 51.4 61.3 61.8 63.3 
 
  
  Austerity 
     
70.1 71.6 
  Alternative 
    
56.6 54.4 
Eurozone Periphery Historical 84.1 69.7 91.2 93.4 100.3     
  Austerity 
     
129.7 106.8 
  Alternative         92.5 82 
United Kingdom Historical 46.6 51.6 96.4 100.2 100.5 
 
  
  Austerity 
     
122 107.7 
  Alternative         79 62.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
